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Constructive Sovereignty for Indigenous Peoples
Leslie Sturgeon*

I. A NEW APPROACH TO THE RIGHTS
OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
Elaborating on current understandings of sovereignty seems, on its face, to
be an exercise in futility. Although several international documents address the
question of who is entitled to status as a sovereign entity, a realistic approach
suggests that the only rights guaranteed to a would-be sovereign entity are those
that it can back by force (deriving either from military might or the force-byproxy that accompanies political or economic influence). The prospect of an
international legal standard for sovereignty is appealing, however, because it
holds out the promise of adjudicating competing claims for territory, as well as
political legitimacy, without resorting to violence or prolonged political upheaval.
Current standards of sovereignty suffer from several flaws that impair their
ability to adjudicate conflict definitively and equitably. They focus too narrowly
on traditionally recognizable groups such as "indigenous peoples," and place a
strong emphasis on historical conditions such as colonization. They urge
international organizations and nation-states to adopt their standards and
policies on normative grounds. In doing so, current standards fail on both a
pragmatic and equitable level. Guilt-saturated normative rhetoric offers little
more than a weak incentive for nation-states to adopt doctrines such as those
promulgated by the International Labour Organisation ("ILO'). Moreover,
fashioning a doctrine for sovereignty out of a disjointed mixture of morally
charged qualities and conditions leads to judicial outcomes (such as Hingitaq53,
discussed below) that seem at odds with the desire to bestow greater sovereignty
on communities where appropriate. Finally, the lack of a pragmatic foundation
makes such doctrines inequitable: rather than applying readily ascertainable
standards to communities with strong claims to sovereignty, judicial entities,

such as the Denmark Supreme Court, allow sovereignty claims to stand or fall
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This pragmatic approach would borrow from two primary sources: the
property law doctrine of adverse possession and Paolo G. Carozza's recent
application of the principle of subsidiarity to international law. Instead of
focusing on a disjointed array of normative and historical features, as most
current conventions do, this approach would apply a different standard: when a
community has manifested (or retained) a significant amount of de facto political
sovereignty (by having its own political institutions, social norms, language,
cultural traditions, economic practices, or dispute-resolution structures), despite
the fact that it inhabits territory under the nominal control of another
government, then it should be granted constructive political sovereignty. As with
the doctrine of adverse possession, this approach would apply a standard tied to
functionality, rather than purported moral claims. A community claiming
sovereignty would have to demonstrate that it has already exercised a significant
amount of its own de facto political sovereignty; courts would take into
consideration factors such as whether those inhabiting the community's territory
align themselves with community leadership and the degree to which cultural,
social, religious, or economic practices set members of the community apart
from nonmembers. Once the right to constructive sovereignty has been
determined, Carozza's principle of subsidiarity would serve as the model for
what kinds of rights would attach to the community. According to Carozza, the
principle of subsidiarity holds that "each social and political group should help
smaller or more local ones accomplish their respective ends without . . .
arrogating those tasks to itself."' Thus, these newly minted sovereigns would not
transform into autarkic, isolated entities; rather, they would retain most of the
broad structural elements of their "host" state, but would reserve the right to
govern themselves and preserve their cultures and political identities.

II. CURRENT STANDARDS APPLIED TO THE THULE TRIBE
A recent bid for certain sovereign rights by a tribe in Greenland illustrates
the many flaws of the current sovereignty doctrines. Appealing to the principles
outlined in a document put forth by the ILO, the tribe petitioned the Danish
government for the right to return to the land from which they had been
forcibly removed several decades ago. The Danish Supreme Court, ostensibly
applying the ILO's standards, denied the tribe's claims and rejected its status as
an "indigenous people."
In accord with the 1951 Defense Treaty between the United States and
Denmark, the Danish government established Thule Air Base near the tribe's

Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiari~y as a StructuralPrincple of InternationalHuman Rights Law, 97 Am J Inl
L 38, 38 n 1 (2003).
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settlement at Uummannaq.2 Two years later, the Danish government ordered the
Thule tribe to relocate further north because the United States planned to install
anti-aircraft guns there.3 The only compensation offered to4 them at the time was
the "[m]odern accommodation[s]" where they were to live.
In 1996, members of the Thule tribe, known collectively as "Hingitaq 53,"
filed a claim in Danish court, arguing that, in addition to monetary
compensation, they were entitled to inhabit the Uummannaq settlement again6
'
and to "move and hunt within the entire Thule district." The tribe's claim
rested primarily upon the ILO Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples in Independent Countries,7 which Denmark ratified in 1996.8
Convention 169 establishes that the ownership rights of indigenous peoples over
the land they "traditionally occupy" must be upheld, and that relocation may
take place only if the government's reasons for the relocation meet stringent
guidelines.9 Article 16(3) gives indigenous peoples the "right to return to their
traditional lands" once the "grounds for relocation" are no longer in force."l In
situations where this is not an option, Article 16(4) states that the relocated
peoples must be given lands equal in "quality and legal status" to those
previously occupied unless they request monetary compensation.
Although the Danish Supreme Court granted the Thule tribe a portion of
the monetary compensation it demanded, the court refused to grant the tribe a
right of return, citing its previous assessment that the tribe did not constitute a

2

Ole Spiermann, InternationalDecision: Hingitaq53, QajutaqPetersen, and Others v. Prime Minister's Office
(QaanaaqMunicpali and Greenland Home Rule Government Intervening in Support of the Appellants), 98
Am J Intl L 572, 573 (2004).

3

Id.

4

Id at 573-74.

s

Id at 574.
1 (Sup Ct 2003) (Denmark), available
Hingitaq 53 v Prime Minister's Office,
<http://www.inuit.org/index.asp?lang=eng&num=257> (visited Mar 14, 2005).

6
7

online at

International Labour Organisation, Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries, ILO Convention No 169, 76th Sess, arts 14, 16, (1989), available online at
<http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C169> (visited Mar 14, 2005) ("ILO Convention
No 169" or "ILO Convention").

8

See note 16 infra.

9

While Article 16(1) provides that indigenous peoples may not "be removed from the lands which
they occupy," Article 16(2) states that if relocation is considered necessary, and consent cannot be
obtained, the relocation may only proceed according to "appropriate procedures," including "the
Cuolefneu."i
l
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"distinct indigenous people" under the guidelines provided by ILO Convention
No 169.12
III. THE DANISH SUPREME COURT'S APPLICATION OF ILO
CONVENTION No 169
Convention 169 defines "indigenous peoples" as tribal groups "whose
social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of
the national community" and who "retain some or all of their own social,
economic, cultural and political institutions. 13 Article (1)(1)(b) states that
"indigenous" peoples are the descendants of the populations that inhabited the
land "at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present
state boundaries.' ' 14 Finally, Article 1(2) states that "[s]elf-identification" as an
indigenous people is a "fundamental criterion" in deciding whether a group
comes under the provisions of ILO Convention No 169.1" While this definition
may initially appear straightforward, many difficulties arise in its application.
This definition employs terminology-political and social "institutions"that naturally gives rise to the question of how such "institutions" will be
recognized in a community that is drastically different from the traditional
nation-state. The distinctive nature of such communities is likely to interfere
with the task of identifying an indigenous population's "economic and political"
institutions in the first place. This underscores the importance of Article 1(2)'s
"self-identification" criterion.
Convention 169 gives significant weight to the experience of being
colonized or conquered. The very fact of colonization or conquest, however,
would almost certainly weaken or destroy the "institutions" that indigenous
peoples are expected to demonstrate. Thus, taken as a whole, the ILO's
definition of "indigenous peoples" is extremely difficult to meet.
Convention 169's requirement that indigenous populations retain "some or
all" of their key societal institutions is ambiguous. Only in the unlikely situation
that a group retains all or none of its key institutions can this standard be
definitively applied. Because most groups at issue retain "some" of their political
or social institutions, it is especially important that this term be meaningful.
Unfortunately, the term "some," as it is employed in Convention 169, seems to
encompass nearly every group that is likely to come under the scrutiny of this
standard.
4 (cited in note 6).

12

Hingitaq53 at
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ILO Convention No 169, art 1(1)(a)-(b) (cited in note 7).

14

Id, art 1(1)(b).

15

Id, art 1(2).
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Article 1(2)'s assertion that "self-identification" is considered a
"fundamental criterion" for adjudication of a group's claim to "indigenous
people" status is similarly unhelpful. This "fundamental criterion" clearly cannot
be considered overriding, since other standards articulated in the Convention
must carry some weight. Convention 169 offers no guidance as to how much
weight this "fundamentalcriterion" should be given. The Danish Supreme Court
assigned it relatively little importance in its Hingitaq 53 decision, and the ILO's
agreement with the court's conclusion renders the status of the criterion even
more ambiguous.
In addition to these internal definitional problems, as of 2004 only
seventeen countries had ratified Convention 169, although its predecessor
(which grants far fewer rights), Convention 107, has been ratified by eighteen
countries 6 Thus, even if Convention 169 could provide a clearer definition and
demarcation of rights, it would still lack the force of legitimacy, since the United
States, Canada, and most major European nation-states have not explicitly
adopted its tenets.
These difficulties manifest themselves in the comments of the Danish
Supreme Court in its ruling in Hingitaq 53. In its opinion, the court noted that
the question of whether the Thule tribe constitutes an "indigenous people" must
be resolved with regard to "current conditions."' 7 The court refused to recognize
the traits that distinguish the Thule tribe from the other inhabitants of
Greenland as grounds for qualification as an "indigenous people," stating that
regional variations of "language, business conditions, and judicial systems" can
be traced to factors inherent in Greenland itself, namely, its size and the
"communication and traffic conditions" arising from its geographical features. 8
Thus, although the Thule tribe may meet the distinct "institutions" requirement
set forth in Article 1(1)(a) and (b), the court reasoned that these distinctive

16

The following countries have ratified ILO Convention No 169: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominica, Ecuador, Fiji, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, the
Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. ILOLEX Database of International Labour
Standards, available online at <http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?C169> (visited Mar
14, 2005). The following countries have only ratified the preceding agreement, ILO Convention
No 107 (which promotes a policy of assimilation and paternalism): Angola, Bangladesh, Belgium,
Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, India, Iraq, Malawi,
Pakistan, Panama, Portugal, Syria, and Tunisia. The following countries originally ratified the
Convention, but have since denounced it: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, and Peru. ILOLEX Database of International Labour Standards,
,viilhle online Ar <hrm://uwwwnil.nroii1lex /ro-Ie/rntifce.nl?C1 07 > (visited Mar 14. 2005).
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features did not arise from the appropriate historical conditions, and therefore
were not relevant to the application of Convention 169.19
As noted in the court's comments, members of the Thule tribe identify
themselves as an "indigenous people."20 Other organizations representing the
interests of indigenous peoples supported the tribe's contention. The twohundred representatives of indigenous peoples who gathered for the Working
Group on the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples stated that
they "unequivocally support" the claims made by the Thule tribe.2 The
Executive Council of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference also issued a statement
of support in June of 2003.22 In making its ruling, however, the Danish Supreme
Court did not appear to take these conclusions into account, despite the fact that
Convention 169 cites "self-identification" as a "fundamental criterion" in
making rulings such as these.
-istorically, the Thule tribe is a distinct and cohesive group by necessity.
The tribe inhabited the Uummannaq settlement as a group of partly nomadic
hunters "since time immemorial," and remained completely isolated until 1818.23
Indeed, even when Rasmussen Knud established an outpost in that area in 1910,24
he attempted to preserve the tribe's "local lifestyle" as "a matter of honor.,
The tribe's forcible relocation in 1953 may also have contributed to the group's
distinctiveness, since it was an experience unique to the members of that
community.
The court's insistence on examining only "current conditions" in
determining the status of the Thule tribe runs afoul of several elements of
Convention 169. By linking the term "indigenous" to a shared experience of
colonization and conquest, the ILO's definition emphasizes historical
conditions. Moreover, the recent erosion of the tribe's social and political
institutions can be traced directly to the 1953 relocation. Far from being
obscured by a centuries-wide gap, this experience took place in recent history
and is well documented on both sides. Many of the tribe's six-hundred members
bringing the claim against the Danish government were actually present during
the relocation. The court's refusal to consider historical events in evaluating the

19

Id at

20

Id at

4-5.

21

Hingitaq 53: Resolution of the Indigenous Peoples Gathered at the 2002 7tb Session of the United Nations

22
23

at
<www.inuit.org/
online
Rights,
available
on
Human
Commission
index.asp?lang=eng&num=231 > (visited Mar 14, 2005).
Inuit Circumpolar Conference, ICC Executive Council Res No 03-02 (2003), available online at
<http://www.inuit.org/index.asp?lang=eng&num=245> (visited Mar 14, 2005).
Spiermann, 98 Am J Intl L at 573 (cited in note 2).

24

Id.

3.
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tribe's claim cannot, therefore, be justified with reference to the possibility of
being stymied by ambiguous recollections of past events.
IV. EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES AND OTHER COMMUNITIES
Although the Danish court's decision in Hingitaq 53 stems, at least in part,
from its questionable interpretation and application of Convention 169, greater
underlying problems hinder groups such as the Thule in their quest for
sovereignty. Those trying to secure greater independence for indigenous peoples
usually appeal to moral sentiments, rather than offering a pragmatic rationale.
The normative nature of their reasoning is especially apparent in their
definitional standards. Most international organizations like the ILO, the United
Nations ("UN"), and the World Council of Indigenous Peoples ("WCIP") cite a
variety of features when determining which groups should be granted stronger
rights against the states they inhabit. The UN's "working definition" considers
factors such as religion, language, dress, means of livelihood, occupation of
"ancestral lands," and, of course, ties to a society predating colonization or
conquest.2 The WCIP's "provisional working definition ' 26 focuses on a group's
connection to "the earliest populations living in the area" and its lack of
"control" over the government of the nation-state it inhabits.2 7 Benedict
Kingsbury notes that members of this movement emphasize a collection of
(what are believed to be) commonly held traits: strong "connections with land
and territory," the experience of colonization by other groups, current problems
stemming from "dispossession and subordination," and a degree of "resistance
to modernization and globalization., 28 Generally excluded from the term
"indigenous peoples" are those whose circumstances and disadvantages are
remarkably similar: minorities who have very little "control" over the
governments of the states in which they live; ethnic groups who live alongside
others in multinational or multiethnic states (usually in Africa or Asia); and
ethnic or national groups whose "sometimes aberrant" frontiers came about as a
result of a ("perhaps legally defunct") colonial government.2 9

25

Benedict Kingsbury, '1ndgenousPeoples" in InternationalLaw: A ConstructivistApproach to the Asian
Controversy, 92 AmJ Intl L 414, 419-20 (1998).

26

Id at 422.

27

Id (quotation omitted).

28

Id at 421.

29

UN ESCOR, Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Study on Treaties, Agreements, and Other Constructive
Arrangements between States and Indigenous Populations, UN Doc E/CN4/Sub2/1999/20 at 15, 89
(1999).
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By focusing on identity-related features (such as ancestral pedigree or a
spiritual relationship to the land), the movement loses sight of possible
pragmatic justifications for granting groups such as "indigenous peoples" a
greater degree of sovereignty and recognition as rights-bearing entities.
Communities that are culturally, socially, or politically cohesive-to the extent
that they claim the right of full or partial sovereignty-may function better, as a
whole, if they are provided with the latitude to operate as they see fit. Certain
rights would attend this grant of sovereignty: the right to use (and protect) the
land they inhabit; the right to preserve cultural trappings such as language, dress,
and religious practices; and the right to maintain and employ traditional dispute
resolution mechanisms that involve individuals within the community. Such an
approach may also reduce the possibility of violent attempts to establish
sovereignty. The benefits of greater autonomy and self-governance would
extend not only to groups classified as "indigenous peoples," but also to those
that have been traditionally excluded from the movement: ethnic or national
minorities, discrete political communities, and perhaps even recently emerged
but cohesive groups, such as independent religious communities.
Paolo G. Carozza has explored the possibilities for such an approach.
Applying the notion of "subsidiarity" to international law, his framework would
grant distinct communities a greater degree of self-determination and selfgovernment, without demolishing the nation-state's recognized sovereignty.30
The "principle of subsidiarity," according to Carozza, holds that "each social and
political group should help smaller or more local ones accomplish their
respective ends without . . . arrogating those tasks to itself."3 Carozza's
framework would allow nation-states to enforce broadly supported notions of
individual rights and freedoms, while granting to local political or social groups
the right to govern themselves according to community traditions or practices
that, though relatively new, form the backbone of a cohesive social or political
community.32 Groups granted constructive sovereignty would not, therefore,
emerge as entirely distinct from the nation-state, but would merely gain greater
autonomy within their own communities, as well as international recognition as
rights-bearing entities.
V. EXAMPLES OF SOVEREIGNTY
Although it might appear impossible to balance the constructive
sovereignty of a community such as the Thule tribe with the internationally

30

See Carozza, 97 Am J Intl L at 38 (cited in note 1).

31

Id at 38 n 1.

32

Id at 78.
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recognized sovereignty of the nation-state where the community resides, the
practice is not entirely without precedent. Recent history shows that
communities can gain greater sovereignty without causing political conflict and
chaos in the international community. Some such examples began as discrete
communities within a nation-state and then were granted international
recognition as microstates; others involve populations seeking greater selfgovernance and having such desires accommodated by the nation-state
government.
In 1993, the Canadian government passed the Nunavut Land Claims Act
("NLCA") and the Nunavut Act, both of which grant significant rights to the
Inuit who inhabit the North West Territories ("NWT").33 The NLCA gave the
Inuit title to at least 352,191 square kilometers in the NWT.34 Although federal
and local laws would apply to this territory, the title granted was "exclusive and
alienable, subject only to certain public access easements and . . .government
activities., 3' The Nunavut Act, effective as of 1999, established a new territory
(Nunavut) that comprised an area almost one-sixth the size of Canada.3 6 Instead
of creating a region whose autonomy overlapped with the authority of an
existing provincial government, the government of Nunavut has rights similar to
the governments of the Yukon or the (former) NWT.37 Although the Nunavut
Act was not enacted to provide specifically for "aboriginal self-determination"
(in the form of explicit ethnic sovereignty),38 the Act allows for a greater degree
of de facto self-government, as well as recognition as a semi-sovereign entity.
One example that is entirely outside the realm of "indigenous peoples" is
that of Vatican City. When the Kingdom of Italy annexed many of the Papal
States-regions where popes, in their secular capacity, had ruled for
centuries-many conflicts arose between these former authorities and the new
Italian government. 39 In 1929, three Lateran Treaties established Vatican City
as an independent state, which granted sovereign authority to The Holy See

33

Jeffrey Wutzke, Comment, Dependent Independence:Application of the Nunavut Model to Native Hawaiian

Sovereignty andSelf-Determination Claims, 22 Am Indian L Rev 509, 534 (1998).
34

Id.

35

Id.

36

Id at 537.

37

See id at 538. The government of Nunavut has power over "voting regulations, taxation,
marriage, incorporations, and the justice system." Id.
Id at 539.

38
39

United States Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Background Note:
The Holy See, available online at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3819.htm> (visited Mar 14,

2005).
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(the government of Vatican City). 40 The Holy See may enter into treaties as

well as diplomatic relationships with other states, and within the UN it has
status as a Non Member State Permanent Observer. Thus, although it has no
power to vote at the UN General Assembly, it is still recognized as a state. 4
With a population of 790, and a territory comprising only 109 acres,42 Vatican
City depends on Italy for many of its "essential services," including water,
phone service, postal service, police, and virtually all physical goods required
by its citizens.4 3
Other examples of this abound in the international context. The 1979
Basque Autonomy Statute, for example, gave certain regional governments
autonomy in implementing the "basic norms" established by the national
government. 44 Thus, although national police and security forces have
authority over matters that extend beyond the community (for example,
"guarding ports, airports, and frontiers"), the "maintenance of public order
45
within the province" falls under the jurisdiction of the Basque government.
The Basque power to enter into treaties is relatively limited: the government
may enter only into "cultural relations" with other states in which Basquespeaking communities reside.46
In other cases, communities have seized uncontested territory and claimed
their identities as sovereign entities, with varying degrees of success. In 1972,
individuals from the Ocean Life Research Foundation (who had dredged up land
in the North and South Minerva Reefs) claimed sovereignty for the Republic of
Minerva, appealing to the doctrine of occupation of terra nullius.4" The founders
sought to establish a state based on libertarian principles in which all property
would (eventually) be privately owned and the government would take an
extremely laissez-faire stance (taxes, for example, would be purely voluntary).48
After a dispute arose with Tonga, and personal disagreements dissolved the

40

Id.

41

42

Matthew N. Bathon, Note, The Aypical InternationalStatus of the Holy See, 34 Vand J Transnad L
597, 604 (2001).
US Department of State, Background Note: The Ho# See (cited in note 39).

43

Bathon, 34 Vand J Transnatl L at 616-17 (cited in note 41).

4

Hurst Hannum and Richard B. Liflich, The Concept of Autonomy in InternationalLaw, 74 Am J Intl L
858, 862 (1980).

45

Id at 876.

46

Id at 875.

47

Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, 'Republic of the Reefs": Nation-Building on the Continental Shef and in the
World's Oceans, 25 Cal W Ind LJ 81, 96-97 (1994) (quotation omitted).
Id at 97.

48
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government of Minerva, the tiny republic "collapsed in disarray" barely a year
after its founding.49
Unlike the Republic of Minerva, the Principality of Sealand, founded in
1967 six miles off the coast of Britain, persists to this day. 0 The territory of
Sealand is Roughs Tower, an abandoned British fortress.5 1 Although Britain
extended its territorial waters from three to twelve miles in 1987, causing some
overlap, since then Britain has made no move to claim Sealand's territory.52
As these examples demonstrate, applying the principle of subsidiarity to
communities claiming sovereignty need not be as drastic as the creation of new
self-sufficient nation-states. In some cases, this principle could be expressed
merely by granting communities more local autonomy, although in other cases,
the creation of an independent state may indeed be warranted.
VI. CONCLUSION
Many inconsistencies that emerged in the Danish Supreme Court's decision
in Hingitaq 53 can be traced to the current approach to sovereignty rights, which
focuses primarily on group identity and abstract norms. A more pragmatic
approach would supply more definitive standards and help eliminate the
arbitrary exclusion of groups claiming greater sovereignty rights. Instead of
emphasizing definitional criteria for groups such as "indigenous peoples," a new
approach would apply the principle of subsidiarity to conflicts of authority and
grant constructive sovereignty when a community would clearly benefit from a
greater degree of autonomy and self-governance.
This kind of approach would have a significant impact on how claims such
as those in Hingitaq 53 might be adjudicated. The courts would focus not on
whether the group meets the criteria provided by documents such as the ILO's
Convention 169,;but on whether the group has demonstrated a sufficient degree
of de facto political sovereignty and whether it is possible to grant official
recognition to the group. This approach would not automatically exclude
communities that deviate from the traditional notion of "indigenous peoples."
Ethnic minorities whose territories were arbitrarily divided during colonization
would also have the opportunity to prove de facto sovereignty. A radical
extension of this theory might consider recognizing communities whose origins
are relatively recent, such as the Amish in the United States and Canada, or the

49
50

51
52

Id at 100-01 (internal citation omitted).
The
Principality
of
Sealand,
Histogy
of
Sealand,
<httt://www.sealandgov.com/historv.htrnl> (visited Mr 14 90n).

Id.
Id.
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members of recently 3founded microstates that have insisted on sovereign status
since their inception.5

53

Although most are short-lived, self-proclaimed nation-states founded by enterprising individuals
and communities, such as the Principality of Sealand, the Kingdom of Humanity, and the
Republic of Minerva tend to behave as though they are sovereign entities. See Menefee, 25 Cal W
Intl LJ at 81 (cited in note 47). More information about Sealand can be found at its website (cited
in note 50).
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